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From a state-centric view, sub-national level of participation at the international level can be 
only feasible if it is an active part of national policy. In the case of Shiga prefectural 
government’s initiative for international lake-environmental cooperation, however, sub-
national actors came to see themselves as direct players in the absence of national policy. 
This study examines under what conditions and in what ways such sub-national level of 
participation takes place by conducting a case study of Shiga’s collaboration with the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) over lake-environment risk reduction. The 
article finds that the process of Shiga’s participation in transnational governance will have 
the less chance of being duplicated effectively in other Japanese sub-national governments. 
Shiga’s cooperation with the UNEP was primarily driven by the ad hoc bottom-up political 
mobilization of the sub-national actors. In general, without institutionalized channels for sub-
national governments to participate in the regional/international level, sub-national 
governments need to mobilize resources on such an ad hoc basis and only pioneering sub-
national actors are capable of effectively engaged on unfamiliar territory with the formation 
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Over the past two decades, sub-national level of participation in transnational environmental 
governance has become noticeable within the EU. It is also increasingly being observed 
beyond the EU political process, yet little is known about the dynamics of sub-national 
participation in the non-EU settings. In this article, while it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to compare with the behaviour of sub-national units of European governments, a case 
situation of Shiga prefectural government’s initiative for transnational lake-environmental 
governance provides a rare opportunity to open up the black box of that participation 
dynamic. Shiga, a prefecture in Japan, was probably one of the world’s few sub-national 
governments to specifically acknowledge the unique properties of lakes, which made up 90% 
of the world’s available surface fresh water, and then to address the lack of local awareness 
of the value of lakes for long-term preservation at the international level. To this end, Shiga 
also reached out to the UNEP for support, without securing the prior approval of the Japanese 
national government. An initial International Lake Environment Conference, held by the 
prefectural government in 1984, was attended by thousands of participants from around the 
world and became an expectedly huge success. In the wake of the conference’s success, the 
UNEP proposed the establishment of an international standing committee to Shiga for 
promoting sustainable management of the world’s lakes and reservoirs. This article will 
examine the potential for the participation of sub-national governments in transnational 
environmental governance by examining the origins, developments, and causes of Shiga’s 
sub-national participation in providing benefits on an international scale for environmental 
risk reduction.  
 
In the early debate on transnational politics, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1974, p. 41) 
confined the concept of transnationalism to the activities of nongovernmental actors, 
differentiating from those of “transgovernmental actors” or “sub-units of governments on 
those occasions when they act relatively autonomously from higher authority in international 
politics.”  According to Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995, p. 9), however, the interactive relations 
of government actors across national boundaries can be consider transnational “when at least 
one actor pursues her own agenda independent of national decisions.”  The necessity of this 
redefinition suggests that the distinction between state-based actors and nongovernmental 
actors has become blurred as sub-national government actors look to transnational networks 
to gain support in the absence of national governments’ action (Bulkeley 2000; Betstill and 
Bulkeley 2004).   In the revelatory case of Shiga, the Japanese statist tradition did not prevent 
the Shiga prefectural government from not operating on behalf of the Japanese national 
government. The result was a well-matched strategy of environmental governance that was 
both international and sub-national, in which the over-loaded UNEP was requesting a 
division of labour for decentralized functions and Shiga prefectural government was turning 
for assistance in the absence of national policy (Kotani 2006, Kyoto Shinbun 10-17 May 
2010, S. Matsumoto, Associate Director of the International Lake Environment Committee or 
ILEC, interview, 15 May 2010).  
 
Transnational networks steer members toward two primary public goals: influencing and 
changing the behaviour of nation-states within the international arena and governing 
transnational issues outside normal national jurisdiction. Epistemic communities (Haas 1989) 
and transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), in which nonstate actors 
operate in alliances with other nonstate actors and state actors, see the sovereign state as the 
object of their advocacy activities. Their focus remains on the first public goal to hold the 
target state to account for international commitments. In contrast, public transnational 
networks (Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2009, pp. 59-61), which sub-units of government 
(sub-national governments, legislators, and judges) establish, often in cooperation with 
international organizations, authoritatively enable governing to take place toward the second 
public goal. In this context, the individual and organizational “constituents” of the networks 
recognize the network authorities as authoritative based on their legal-formal ability to 
exercise control and coordination (Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2009, p. 56).  One of the 
largest public transnational networks, Cities for Climate Protection (CCP), was initiated by 
the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) in 1993 and involves 
more than 1000 local governments worldwide. These sub-national actors, often from 
countries with limited national commitments, are integrating climate change mitigation into a 
form of inter-municipal governance beyond national boundaries. Likewise, the coalition of 
Shiga-UNEP was not established to primarily influence sovereign states but rather to enhance 
governance practices in a form of decentralized cooperation, in which local actors take up a 
key role.  
 
Yet the coalition of Shiga-UNEP is not easily accounted for by the concepts of transnational 
networks and governance. As discussed in the following section, this is primarily due to the 
connections between vertical territorial tiers of government and horizontally formed networks 
of governance. As compared to some federal systems, such as those of Austria, Belgium, 
Germany and Switzerland, where sub-national authorities can conduct foreign policies in 
matters of their competence, Japan’s unitary system does not formally recognize the legal 
right of sub-national authorities to represent themselves at the international level. To establish 
the ILEC, without explicitly challenging the hierarchy of territorial jurisdictions, Shiga was 
nevertheless able to directly negotiate with the UNEP. Political mobilization allowed the like-
minded coalition of Shiga-UNEP to create the ILEC by bypassing the established relations of 
Japanese central-local relations, yet without completely superseding them. The formation of 
this coalition can be seen to come from mutual dependence in a horizontal fashion. Once 
formed, however, the necessity of coalition maintenance brought back the prefectural 
government to deal with the hierarchical territorial tiers for accessing national financial 
resources. The ILEC provided support services at the international level for continuous 
improvement of lake-basin governance that would integrate institution, policy, participation, 
science, technology and funding (ILEC 2007). The ILEC, given a Japanese legal status in 
1987, sought to exercise discretionary power over its allocated national funds by acting as an 
independent provider of policy innovation and expertise which the national government had 
been neither willing to manage nor capable of providing it (H. Kotani, former ILEC 
Managing Diector, interview, 12 May 2010, Kira 1990, Kyoto Shinbun, 11 May 2010, p.3, 
Shiga Prefecture 1988, pp. 329-32).  
 
This article is organized into three parts. First, the theoretical importance of sub-national 
level of participation in transnational environmental governance is outlined. Second, tracing 
the course of Shiga’s action will identify the ways the prefectural government participates in 
international outreach to the ILEC and the UNEP . The third part presents a set of pertinent 
arguments for further inquiry while drawing on the findings of this heuristic case study.   
 
Why is it worth knowing sub-national level of participation? 
 
The UNEP is the chief agency, which is expected to promote the development of coherence 
among environmental institutions involved on multiple geographic scales by various actors. 
However, there are more than 500 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) whose 
autonomous secretariats have been operating for the implementation, assessment and 
enforcement. MEAs have been developed primarily as a way of solving issue-by-issue or 
sectoral problems. The provision of environmental risk reduction has dealt with institutional 
fragmentation, which may result in the duplication of activities and resources and 
inconsistencies among decisions of different agreements (Hyvarinen and Brack 2000, 
Mitchell 2010). To provide a blueprint for solving these problems, two basic categories of 
reform options are proposed: the establishment of a more authoritative and better-resourced 
international environmental organization (e.g., Esty 2000, Rung 2001) or the functional 
integration of “clustering” of several MEAs (e.g., von Moltke 2001) / “policy networks” of 
cross-sectoral partnerships (Howlett 2000, Streck 2002). The reform options are divided 
among scholars; however, the establishment of a strong international organization is not 
necessarily incompatible with the other reform options in the sense that clustering and policy 
networking are still necessary for more effective international environmental organization. 
 
Clustering refers to the grouping of a number of international environmental agreements, in 
order to minimize institutional overlap and coordinate operations (von Moltke 2001, p. 3). 
Thematic clusters, such as conservation and global atmosphere, are seen as viable tools for 
making operations and funding more efficient. In contrast, cross-sectoral partnerships aim to 
build policy networks by bringing together different sectors, such as civil society, 
corporations, governments, and international organizations, to solve environmental problems 
a single sector cannot govern (Streck 2002). Sub-national government can be part of those 
policy networks. Both clustering and cross-sectoral reform options address concerns 
primarily in a horizontal dimension of environmental policy integration. Vertical policy 
integration across various territorial tiers of governance is also required to bring about a 
comprehensive integration of environmental strategies (Bache and Flinders 2004, p. 3). It is 
crucial to bridge policy gaps among local action, national policy and global strategies. Much 
of the scholarly work to date surrounding transnational networks tends to overlook the role of 
sub-national governments while regarding the state as a single national entity. A review of 
the practices across a number of countries basically presents three institutional approaches to 
subnational-national environmental policy linkages: state-centric governance, autonomous 
governance, and multi-level governance. Each approach provides sub-national actors with 
distinctive channels for political mobilization in a global environmental game (Marks 1996, 
Bomberg and Peterson 1998, Hooghe and Marks 2001).  
 
State-centric governance is a nationally led framework embedded within institutional 
boundaries for extending channels that can serve to incentivize sub-national action for 
international environmental cooperation. These channels, for example, through sub-national 
participation in diplomatic representation and in the parliamentary approval of treaties, are 
institutionalized to clarify subnational roles in achieving national goals within the context of 
international obligations or to establish a division of labor among levels of government with a 
state-centric gate-keeping capacity (Marks 1996, pp. 31-32, Bomberg and Peterson 1998, pp. 
227-28, Hooghe and Marks 2001, p.78, Skelcher 2005, p. 94). This is the most common 
approach (based on the established institutional boundaries of polity) that arises out of the 
traditional state-centric framework. In essence, national policy either regulates or enables 
sub-national level of participation in transnational environmental governance. In this process, 
sub-national level of the participation tends to be legitimized by domestic benefits rather than 
sharing the costs of environmental risk reduction beyond national borders (Hoffmann 1966, 
Taylor 1983, Moravcsik 1993). China is most approximate to this ideal-type as it extends 
incentive schemes as well as top-down policies toward sub-national actors (Yuan 2007). Sub-
national actors have primarily an implementation role to play if national environmental 
targets are to be met. The key issue of state-centric policy coordination for national 
government is to effectively monitor progress at the sub-national level for an understanding 
of aggregate progress at national scale and further within the context of international 
obligation (Aall, Groven, and Lindseth 2007). In an ideal type of state-centric governance, it 
is only the national governments that can entrust to an international environmental 
organization the power to set the limits of national sovereignty regarding environmental 
concerns. Sub-national authorities could operate only through the representatives of central 
state authorities in either the functional integration of clustering or cross-sectoral partnerships. 
In Risse-Kappen’s view, sub-national activities that cross national boundaries are not 
considered transnational to the extent that they are operating on behalf of a national 
government. National governments thus pursue vertically non-overlapping jurisdictions of 
environmental policy integration between tiers of governance.  
 
Perhaps, more relevant to the non-EU settings is another ideal type, autonomous governance, 
that directs attention toward bottom-up political mobilization of sub-national authorities. This 
ideal type assumes that, in a legal-formal sense, the national governments are still the sole 
legitimate representatives of domestic interests at the international level. Yet sub-national 
authorities from countries with the capacity limitations and environmental failures of their 
national governments are more likely to transnationally reach out as an alternative means of 
problem-solving. These authorities, while mobilized across institutional boundaries of polity, 
independently participate in transnational environmental governance, either due to a lack of 
support from national government or in the absence of national regulation. Without any 
familiar ground of institutionalized rules or the right to legitimately represent itself at the 
international level, the agency of sub-national actors finds a way through non-
institutionalized or informal channels to move across levels of governments and deal directly 
with counterparts in other countries and supranational actors in a rather ad hoc fashion. 
Informal extra-national channels, such as the establishment of their independent overseas 
offices for lobbying and transnational associations representing sub-national governments, 
are sought to push for increased involvement of sub-national authorities in decision-making 
at the international level (Hooghe and Marks 1996, pp. 82-90, Bomberg and Peterson 1998, 
pp. 228-31, Jeffery 2000, Fairbrass and Jordan 2004, Peters and Pierre 2004). Sub-national 
mobilization, which takes place on the basis of unfamiliar rules or little institutionalization 
across national boundaries, requires sufficient resources and a strong commitment of sub-
national leadership, knowledge, experience and political will to act upon environmental 
policy. As a result, not all sub-national auhtorities have enough potential to act as 
independent transnational actors. The creation of inter-subnational networks and coalition 
building with like-minded actors can characterize non-institutionalized channels for sub-
national governments to participate in international environmental cooperation.  
 
The third institutional approach (involving the restructuring of state polity) is an integral one 
or multi-level governance (MLG) that combines the two other institutional approaches into a 
synergistic dialogue of policy where the national governments give to sub-national authorities 
the right to legitimately represent themselves at the international level and contribute to the 
policy-making process without national supervision. In other words, the national 
governments institutionally empower sub-national authorities as autonomous transnational 
actors. EU member states, for example, through sub-national participation in the Committee 
of the Regions and sub-national collaboration with the European Commission, institutionalize 
channels for their sub-national governments to move independently across different spheres 
of authority to influence decision-making at the international level (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 
pp. 73-82, Marks 1997, pp. 31-32, Bomberg and Peterson 1998, pp. 223-27, Hooghe and 
Marks 2001, pp. 81-86). If an ideal type of MLG is that of “a system of continuous 
negotiations among nested governments at several territorial tiers,” (Marks 1993, p. 392) then 
the formally independent but functionally interdependent sub-national level of participation 
can be seen as a dimension of MLG. This institutional structure for international 
environmental cooperation is organized around decentralized, dense networks between a 
variety of governments and other actors active in a joint domain (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 
Gustavsson, Elander, and Lundmark 2009). These networks can be examined from a vertical 
and a horizontal dimension; they vertically involve the interdependence of government 
operations at different territorial levels and horizontally reveal the interdependence between 
governments and non-governmental actors across territorial levels (Bache and Flinders 2004, 
p. 3).  The density of the networks is likely to absorb the underperformance or failure of one 
organization and continue to jointly generate governance capacity (Haas 2004, p. 4). Yet the 
problems of accountability require agencies to specialize in a specific method of 
accountability with shared professional expertise (Sorensen and Torfing 2005, Harlow and 
Rawlings 2007). The EU polity has been significantly restructured in such a way (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001).  
 
Although these three institutional approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the 
coalition formation between Shiga and the UNEP predominantly displays an instance of the 
second one with its effort for cross-sectoral solution. As the detailed implementation of 
global environmental strategies is specified, the necessity of sub-national participation at the 
local scale will become more salient. Internationally agreed environmental goals need to be 
implemented in coordination with local realities and conditions. The UNEP and other 
environmental bodies need to be strengthened to assist multi-level integration for the 
management of international environmental goods, and they are expected to work closely 
with a variety of stakeholders and governments right down to the sub-national level.  
 
How did Shiga dare to get involved? 
The Shiga prefectural government reached out for international environmental cooperation on 
behalf of voters who found it impossible to ignore the severity of lake pollution and thus 
whose concern with it prevailed over pro-development policies in electoral processes. Today, 
however, prefectural officials in Shiga firmly believe that the participation of sub-national 
governments at the international level is a crucial part of environmental governance (Shiga 
Prefecture 1985, pp. 50-59, Shiga Prefecture 1988, pp. 329-33, Shiga Prefecture 1996, pp. 8-
9, H. Kotani, interview, 12 May 2010, T. Nakamura, Department of Environmental Policy, 
Shiga Prefecture, interview, 11 September 2011). This case study suggests that three key 
ingredients enabled the Shiga prefectural government to get involved in international 
environmental cooperation: the visibility of lake-environmental degradation and the 
traceability of responsibility, qualities of strong gubernatorial commitment and leadership, 
and capacity-building of prefectural administration.  
 
In the early 1970s, the surface of Lake Biwa in the pristine north-western shore unexpectedly 
turned red due to phenomenon known as akashio (freshwater “red tide”) (Kondo 2002, pp. 
50-51).
1
 The cause was traced to phosphorous content of synthetic household detergents. As 
it became a matter of concern for people’s health, the local Women’s Organization Liaison 
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 As environmental impacts are manifested locally and adaptive capacity is determined by 
local conditions, municipal governments were first movers in the environmental policy area 
of Japanese history. However, the lake is completely encompassed within Shiga prefecture, 
situated across most municipalities in the prefecture, with its surface area of 674.4 square 
kilometers occupying one-sixth of the prefecture's total area. The policy initiatives were 
taking place at the prefectural level. 
 
Committee (consisting of the Local Women’s Association, labor union women’s groups and 
consumers’ cooperatives) began to organize a movement for reduction of synthetic detergent 
usage. The administrative practice of reporting the environmental degradation of Lake Biwa 
did not attract much public attention but the “Three-Drop” citizens’ movement (calling for 
the reduction of synthetic detergent from five to three drops at a time), organized by the 
Committee in 1971, became a turning point to uncovering the problem by linking the 
household practice with the technical eutrophication of the lake. In the mid-1970s, as 
eutrophication became toxic, the prefectural government joined this movement to campaign 
on the lake environment by framing it into a “causal story” that told who was to bear 
responsibility (H. Kotani, interview, 12 May 2010, T. Nakamura, interview, 11 September 
2011).
2
 In 1978 the citizen-led synthetic detergent ban movement established a Prefectural 
Movement Liaison Conference, in cooperation with the prefectural government, to promote 
the use of soap power (sekken undo or soap campaign) (Biwako Kaigi 1999, pp. 2-6). In the 
following year, this resulted in the passage of a prefectural Ordinance Relating to the 
Prevention of Eutrophication in Lake Biwa (Biwako Jorei) for regulating synthetic detergent 
sales and use.  
 
In 1974 this issue was involved in a gubernatorial election, as a challenger, Takemura 
Masayoshi, took a reformist stance with his support for the movement to ban synthetic 
detergents, and defeated a conservative incumbent, Governor Nozaki Kin’ichiro. The election 
had become polarized between Nozaki’s pro-development conservatism and Takemura’s 
environmental reformism; there were no other influential alternatives but to let either pro-
business or life quality lead Shiga prefecture (Takemura 1986). Once successfully elected, 
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 For the politics of telling compelling “causal stories” for agenda setting, see Deborah Stone 
(1989). 
Takemura had more of a range to maneuver for seeking resource commitments to 
international environmental cooperation that would have been unpopular in the polit ical 
climate of pro-development. In 1978 once successfully re-elected for a second term without 
contestation (running on both government and opposition tickets), the governor instructed his 
staff members to “organize an international conference that will provide Shiga residents with 
an opportunity to learn precedents (on lake-environment risk reduction) abroad” (Kotani 
2006, p. 2). Obviously, it was also intended for prefectural officials to learn policies and 
practices from counterparts in other countries. At the stage of policy formation, the exercise 
of gubernatorial power effectively promoted the policy rationale as there was little politicized 
tension between the governor and prefectural assemblies or influential local figures. The 
prefectural department concerned committed itself to progressive policy making since there 
was no likelihood of changing hands to a new chief executive (T. Kagatsume, ILEC 
Managing Secretary General, interview, 12 May 2010). 
 
As the city of Chicago began to regulate the use of phosphate content in 1971, the worsening 
eutrophication of the rivers and lakes became known as a worldwide problem. Local 
knowledge and experience in Japan was not sufficient to cope with the environmental stresses 
of Lake Biwa. In the late 1970s, lack of experience and expertise led the prefectural 
Environmental Bureau to mobilize a variety of overseas partners in preparation for drafting a 
prefectural ordinance on the prevention of eutrophication of Lake Biwa (Biwako Jorei). 
Researchers in the Canada Centre for Inland Water were invited to share their internationally 
known expertise on eutrophication (Kotani 2006, p. 2). The activities and lessons of Lake 
Taupo in New Zealand, which had displayed the lake environment and water quality similar 
to Lake Biwa, provided prefectural officials with the process of learning about lake 
environments (Kotani 2006, p. 3). In the early 1980s, a delegation of the prefectural 
government went on a few fact-finding tours to Germany on the shore of Lake Constance 
(also similar to Lake Biwa) to have inputs to the formulation of a 1984 prefectural ordinance 
governing the conservation of natural scenery (Fukei Jorei) (Kira 1990, pp. 27-54). With 
growing momentum to develop their relationships with overseas counterparts, prefectural 
officials planned to hold an unprecedented international conference for bringing together 
interested citizens, scientists and government officials whose ideas were laid down by 
Governor Takemura in 1981. This plan unintentionally became a stepping-stone towards the 
development of a lake environment policy network in which those actors transnationally 
engage in policy innovation and coordination by diffusing ideas and influencing the policy 
measures adopted (Shiga Prefecture 1988, pp. 329-33, Kira 1990, pp. 223-225, 240-47, T. 
Kagatsume, interview, 12 May 2010). 
 
Unlike one-dimensional industrial pollution control over concentrated polluters, diffused 
pressures on the lake environment were difficult to confront. Targeting household detergents, 
however, made one diffuse source of pollution very clear: any consumer buying dangerous 
detergents was contributing to the problem. The citizen-led framing of public opinion on 
Lake Biwa pollution made the idea of holding an international conference into an attractive 
potential source of legitimacy and accountability for prefectural policy. Equally important, 
gubernatorial leadership was a key ingredient in Shiga’s ability to get involved in 
international environmental cooperation. Without the governor’s commitment, the unique 
idea of international conference would never have got onto the policy agenda. Such 
progressive moves might be facilitated only when progressives held political power by a very 
comfortable electoral margin, or when the governor was in a strong enough position to 
remain undamaged by the scrutiny of voters. To realize his commitment, the long-serving 
governor won a good-will of his government officials for cooperation. Due to the technicality 
of lake management, the prefectural technocrats, who had become well informed through 
information sharing with overseas counterparts, began to assume a major role in the policy 
debate while drawing on help from scientists in the fields of lake-environmental conservation.  
 
How did national government either regulate or enable?  
After the 1992 Earth Summit recognition of sub-national authorities as key players in global 
environmental strategies, this principle was incorporated into Japan’s Basic Environmental 
Law in the following year. This law states (in Article 34) that the state shall take measures to 
promote activities by sub-national governments for international environmental cooperation. 
Nonetheless, international cooperation has not been stipulated as grounds for permissible 
functions in the Local Autonomy Law, which define the scope of sub-national operation by 
an enumeration of specific responsibilities. The national government has neither regulated 
extra-national channels for sub-national level of participation in international environmental 
cooperation nor institutionalized such channels for empowering sub-national governments.
3
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 As of 2002, 87% (41) of 47 prefectures, 100% (12) of 12 “designated cities” – population at 
least 500,000, 21% (6) of 29 “core cities” – population at least 300,000, and 2.5% of cities 
with a population larger than 50,000 (nearly 500 municipalities) had been involved in 
international environmental cooperation at some level. Those activities had been engaged 
predominantly in the form of accepting overseas trainees (100% of those municipalities 
involved), holding international conferences/seminars (32%), and dispatching experts abroad 
(24%). Most of the training, offered by those local governments, has been under a national 
programme run by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a state agency which is 
responsible for the technical cooperation of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
programs. See Ministry of the Environment (2004, p. 166). It is also important to note that 
there are a few exceptional projects for which municipalities, such as Kitakyushu and 
Without waiting for national regulations nor getting national enabling support, a few front-
runner municipalities have developed some form of partnerships with international 
organizations: Osaka with the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) since 1992, Fukuoka 
with the UN Human Settlements Programme (HABITAT) Regional Office since 1997, 
Kitakyushu with the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP) since 2000, Kawasaki with the UNEP since 2005, and Nagoya with the U N 
Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) since 1971, and one city has hosted 
international city-to-city network programmes: Yokohama with the regional network of local 
governments, CITYNET, since 1987.  
 
The cases of the first four municipalities indicate that international environmental 
cooperation is likely to take place with the support of national government when the city or 
prefecture has experienced and successfully overcome severe environmental problems in the 
past and wish to transfer local experience and expertise to developing countries (North-South 
dimension) (Nakamura, Elder, and Mori 2011). In contrast, Shiga’s motives behind its 
coalition with the UNEP were to foster policy learning and find solutions in the absence of 
national support. In the case of Nagoya, the UNCRD was established in the city in 1971 by 
an agreement between the UN and the Japanese national government. Nagoya City has hosted 
the UNCRD since then and this is a special case of nationally initiated arrangement. 
Yokohama is a case where the city, pursuing its own commitment independent of national 
                                                                                                                                                  
Hiroshima, have participated in the implementation stage of ODA-funded “Japan-China 
Environmental Model City Projects.”  These Japanese municipalities have transferred a 
comprehensive set of their environmental management and technology to Chinese 
counterpart municipalities. 
policy, hosts CITYNET for South-South cooperation not only in the field of environment but 
in the general area of urban management. 
 
The partnership between Shiga-UNEP to create the ILEC was the earliest experience in Japan 
of this kind to national authorities. In April 1983, Shiga’s preparatory office for the proposed 
conference was established at the prefectural Environmental Bureau. Governor Takemura 
requested sponsorship support from the national Ministry of Construction that had national 
jurisdiction over water resource development; its expected endorsement would have provided 
him with a major boost in his effort to hold the conference. However, the Land and Water 
Bureau of the ministry utterly renounced the conference proposal by saying, “it is not a 
consultation with us but an already fixed plan” and rejected the request (Kyoto Shinbun, 11 
May 2010, p. 3). Even national Environment Agency technocrats, who were supposed to 
coordinate the administration of environmental policies, were quoted as saying, “Why on 
earth does a rural prefecture wish to hold an international conference?” (Kotani 2006, p. 4, 
Kyoto Shinbun, 11 May 2010, p. 3). The prefectural officials construed the reactions as an 
indication of the Japanese statist tradition that could have welcomed the involvement of 
Shiga in joint problem-solving and policy learning but only insofar as the prefectural 
initiative is chartered by the national ministries (Kotani, interview, 12 May 2010, Kira 1990, 
Kyoto Shinbun, 11 May 2010, p.3). Shiga’s relations with the Ministry of Construction had 
already been sour, especially since 1972 when the both parties reached a political agreement 
for the redevelopment of the Lake Biwa area, a plan referred to as a national project 
“BIWASO.” As BIWASO was concerned with water-resources development for the 
neighbouring prefectures, the Shiga prefectural government accepted the national plan in 
exchange for material benefits to its local communities. The River Bureau in the national 
ministry regarded the sponsorship request as Shiga’s pretext for another political gain over 
water-resource management (Kotani, interview, 12 May 2010). The unsupportive responses 
by the ministries may also be associated with the legal system of environmental policy in 
Japan. Pollution prevention and control was mostly of local origin reflecting local 
environmental conditions; the legal system had provided more local discretion than any other 
issue areas. Air and Water Pollution Control Laws were cases in point whereby the national 
government left local governments to legally impose even stricter controls than national ones 
in accordance with the natural and social conditions of their areas, so much so that the 
national government had little understanding of international environmental cooperation 
necessary for lake-environmental governance at the sub-national level (Kotani 2006, p. 4, 
Kyoto Shinbun, 11 May 2010, p. 3).  
 
Nationally-led enabling frameworks to incentivize sub-national authorities also faced 
implementation barriers. The state administration revealed a lack of coordination among 
relevant ministries, causing the fragmentation of national policy-making for the promotion of 
sub-national level of participation in international environmental cooperation. It was subject 
to ministerial rivalries. The Ministry of Home Affairs had initially gained primary control 
over the budget and administration of international environmental cooperation through its 
agency called the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR). The 
CLAIR, consisting mainly of temporary transferees from local governments, suffered from a 
lack of expertise whose accumulation was prevented by its frequent personnel reshuffle 
(Iwata 2009, p. 4). Meanwhile, in the ODA Charter of 1992, the Cabinet acknowledged the 
potential role of Japanese local governments to implement foreign aid (MOFA 2001). The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs accordingly began to support local governments’ environmental 
ODA initiatives through the JICA while seeing the local ODA as an alternative way of 
financing MEA implementation in the South. There was little program coordination between 
the Ministries of Home and Foreign Affairs (McConnell 1996, Iwata 2009, pp. 4-5). The 
Environmental Agency, which had been established in 1971 with the aim of coordinating the 
administration of environmental policies, still had to rely in practice on the exclusive exercise 
of other ministries’ jurisdiction over environment-related matters. 
 
Probably, the real challenge to a national enabling framework for sub-national level of 
participation was how to translate and implement norms, regulations, rules and commitments, 
which had been internationally agreed by the Japanese national government, into operational 
actions. In fact, the necessity of integrating sub-national actions to ensure the optimal 
reduction of environmental risks had been provided for in the MEAs themselves. A large 
number of MEAs, while imposing direct legal obligations on member states, prescribed the 
necessary planning and operational actions at the sub-national level, for example, Article 3 of 
the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Article 5 of the 1972 
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Article 4-
2-(c) of the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Article 4 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The state-centric mindset of 
Japanese national authority tended to devote itself to its direct state obligations under MEAs 
but failed to develop policy frameworks to enable sub-national action for MEA 
implementation (Isozaki 1997, Haneishi 2004, pp. 66-67). In legal-formal terms, sub-national 
authorities had to wait until the domestic application of individual treaties to sub-national 
operations was statutorily specified.  
 
How did Shiga get political channels beyond the national boundary? 
Acting out of its own interest or utility, Shiga had begun to recognize that sub-national action 
would not suffice to produce a desired solution without international cooperation and policy 
learning. But this functional necessity did not automatically drive the agency of the 
prefectural actors to engage in international environmental cooperation. Political mobilization 
was necessary. There was no constellation of existing rules by which Shiga prefectural 
government may decide what to do and evaluate the behavior of others beyond the national 
boundary. Without any familiar ground of institutionalized rules or the right to legitimately 
represent itself at the international level, Governor Takemura found a way through political 
mobilization to move across levels of government and deal directly with the supranational 
actor, UNEP, in a rather ad hoc fashion. 
 
In the absence of institutionalized channels through which the prefectural government was to 
be attached as a participant to the permanent representation of the Japanese state, Governor 
Takemura bypassed the national government by dealing directly with the UNEP. A series of 
his action had its origins in bottom-up, self-directed mobilization with loose and 
opportunistic features.  In April 1983 the informal channel opened up to Shiga when a 
prefectural official had an opportunity to meet visiting UNEP officials at the International 
Division of the national Environmental Agency in Tokyo. When the prefectural 
Environmental Bureau sought sponsorship for the international conference, the UNEP 
responded enthusiastically, providing a stark contrast to the cold response of the national 
Environment Agency. Director Hisao Sakimura, UNEP’s support measures division, who 
was clearly aware of the necessity of decentralized cooperation, reported back to Nairobi on 
the proposed conference; the idea was immediately endorsed by Executive Director Mostafa 
Tolba of the UNEP (Kotani 2006, p. 4, Kyoto Shinbun, 11 May 2010, p. 3, S. Matsumoto, 
interview, 12 May 2010).
 
The proposed conference subsequently attracted strong sponsorship 
not only from the UNEP, but also from the United Nations University (UNU), the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Shiga Prefecture 1985, pp. 50-51, Kyoto 
Shinbun, 11 May 2010, p. 3). Shiga prefecture had thus entered a first phase of enhanced 
cooperative relationships with the UNEP. Due to its role played in creating the ILEC, Shiga 
has received more substantial recognition, including warm appreciation and enthusiasm, at 
the international level than from its own national government .  
 
The influence of individuals, especially the role played by Governor Takemura, should not be 
overstated, for systematic factors, such as the severity of lake pollution, national 
government’s inaction, and the over-loaded UNEP, provided specific structural 
circumstances under which the governor was able to be instrumental in taking his initiative 
for international environmental cooperation. Yet it is safe to say that the gubernatorial 
entrepreneurship was a necessary condition for establishing the ILEC in the sense that, 
without Takemura’s commitment, the progressive initiative wouldv have never got onto the 
policy agenda. 
 
How did Shiga and the UNEP enable each other? 
Political mobilization took place as much outside domestic procedures as within conventional 
boundaries. Both the UNEP and Shiga tried to find in the blurring of the foreign-domestic 
divide a way to improve or strengthen their position and to pursue their goals. The UNEP 
demonstrated its capacity to cross the foreign-domestic gate without formal permission of the 
Japanese national government for promoting the decentralized functions of global 
environmental governance. Shiga was willing and capable of exploiting the informal channel 
across national boundaries without completely superseding the existing inter-governmental 
relations. 
 
As a pre-conference session was scheduled in September 1983, Shiga’s preparatory office 
began to recruit participants through media outlets. The office received a rather cold response 
from major national newspapers. The then head of Yomiuri Shinbun branch office was quoted 
as saying, “If any interest in the lake conference at all, it would most likely be from Shiga’s 
concerned residents” (Kotani 2006, p. 5). The preparatory office remained committed to 
“framing” the lake environment for better public understanding or a quality of 
communication that would make issues attractive to and persuasive for targeted audiences (H. 
Kotani, interview, 12 May 2010; T. Nakamura, interview, 11 September 2011).
4
 Much to 
their surprise, these newspapers learned that a press-release successfully attracted much 
larger crowds than expected, with more than the admission capacity of 900 attendees 
registered across the nation within just one week (Kyoto Shinbun, 11 May 2010, p. 3). In 
spring 1984 the international conference, scheduled to be held in August, was reported and 
discussed almost everyday somewhere in national newspapers. On the last day of the 
International Lake Environment Conference, the importance of the lake environment issue 
was highlighted even in an Asahi Shinbun’s comic strip, known as Fuji Santaro (like 
Doonesbury). During August 27 – 31 of the international conference, about 2,400 participants, 
including those from 28 other countries, were involved in the official proceedings, and an 
astonishing 10,000 citizens’ representatives staged a variety of forums alternative to the 
official meetings (Shiga Prefecture 1985, pp. 50-51, Kyoto Shinbun, 12 May 2010, p. 3). It is 
important to note that Shiga’s initiatives accordingly gained political legitimacy through 
mobilizing a large number of concerned citizens as well as government officials and 
scientists for the international conference. 
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 For the notion of framing, see Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) and Keck and 
Sikkink (1998, pp. 2-3).  
The real news of the international conference was made during the UNEP Executive Director 
Mostafa Tolba’s final speech in which he proposed the establishment of an international 
standing committee that was to co-organize a biennial World Lake Conference with the local 
host country taking over tasks and outcomes from the initial Shiga conference (Kira 1990, pp. 
240-41, Kotani 2006, p. 7, Kyoto Shinbun, 15 May 2010, p. 3). Immediately after the 
international conference, he visited the national Environment Agency in an attempt to 
redistribute some functions of international environmental governance to Japan, and 
requested that Director General Ueda Minoru of the agency create an “international Shiga 
committee” that would serve as a Secretariat for lake environmental monitoring and 
conference organization (Kotani 2006, p. 7). In contrast to the Environment Agency’s 
dispassionate attitude, Governor Takemura enthusiastically responded to Tolba’s call, 
declaring at a press conference, “We (Shiga prefectural government) will take the plunge to 
realize the proposal” (Kyoto Shinbun, 15 May 2010, p. 3). Noticeably absent from the initial 
supporters of the process toward establishing the ILEC was Japan’s national bureaucracy. 
The driving force behind the process was an emerging coalition of the like-minded 
prefectural government and UNEP. 
 
In September 1984 Shiga’s preparatory office, while working on a final report of the 
International Lake Environment Conference, started to prepare for the creation of an 
international Shiga committee. Without challenging its existing relationships with the 
national government, it called for help to legitimize the process of Shiga’s involvement from 
the two key national representatives of domestic interests: the International Division (of the 
national Environmental Agency) that had dealt with the UNEP over a decade, and the United 
Nations Policy Division (of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Two aides from each division 
planned to meet on a monthly basis with Shiga’s preparatory office with their divisional 
expectation that the creation might gradually occur over years. Meanwhile, when the 
Japanese delegation (of the national Environmental Agency) was scheduled to attend in May 
1985 at a UNEP management board meeting, Governor Takemura was also invited directly 
by Executive Director Tolba to report the outcomes of the International Lake Environment 
Conference. Shiga’s preparatory office requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue the 
governor an official passport for being part of the Japanese delegation.  At first, the ministry 
declined to issue it saying that there was no precedent for issuing official passports to sub-
national government officials. Governor Takemura eventually managed to carry an official 
passport on condition that he be treated as “advisor” to the Japanese delegation. Yet, much to 
Japanese national government’s displeasure, the UNEP Nairobi office treated Governor 
Takemura as de facto chief of the Japanese delegation. As soon as he had arrived in Nairobi, 
Executive Director Tolba had a lengthy meeting, attended by a Japan Broadcasting 
Corporation reporter, with him. At the meeting, Governor Takemura expressed his 
determination to push through the establishment of an international Shiga committee “within 
a year.” Executive Director Tolba then promised to extend support through an UNEP 
management team. This story was immediately reported as the latest top breaking news in 
Japan. Once it became public knowledge, the national Environmental Agency was unable to 
back down from it.
5
   
 
The prefectural government pursued to tackle the lake-environmental issue beyond the 
national boundary and found itself in an unfamiliar sphere of authority where it took 
initiatives in the absence of ground rules. Accessing the informal channels did not 
automatically lead to the sources of influence in the bottom-up political mobilization of the 
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and Author’s interview with H. Kotani, Shiga, Japan, 12 May 2010. 
sub-national government. The informal, ad hoc channels provided Governor Takemura with 
points of access to his political entrepreneurship. The governor demonstrated that he was 
capable of avoiding the hierarchical constraints of the central state and manipulating them to 
his advantages. In this context, the prefectural capability of acting independently was well 
matched by the UNEP’s necessity of policy frameworks to support sub-nation level action. 
The under-funded and overloaded UNEP (Haas 2004) was determined to meet the need for 
decentralizing environmental governance functions, in order to pave the way for future 
environmental problem solving (Kira 1990, p. 242, S. Matsumoto, interview, 12 May 2010). 
 
Was Shiga’s coalition maintenance successful? 
Since there were no domestic statutory provisions or procedures to allow for sub-national 
governments to engage in international environmental governance functions, in February 
1986 the ILEC was initially started as private organizations neither regulated nor protected by 
domestic law (nin’i dantai). Its first task was environmental monitoring that would involve 
collecting data about the environmental quality of lakes around the globe. Although 
promising to offer initial set-up funds to the project, the UNEP found itself unable to sign a 
contract with the unregistered ILEC (Kotani 2006, p. 19). In 1987 Governor Inaba Minoru, 
successor to Takemura, accordingly decided to re-establish it as a legally recognized 
foundational organization for public benefits (zaidan hojin). This arrangement allowed the 
prefectural government to legally supply the ILEC with both its own funds and human 
resources. To gain legal status, however, the ILEC became under the supervisory jurisdiction 
of both the national Environmental Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, an 
ex-national Environmental Agency official was invited to take up the director of the board in 
the ILEC (Kotani 2006, p. 20). This situation was a double-edged sword, with the beneficial 
effects of improved access to national funds to be offset by the potentially adverse effects of 
national supervision. ILEC’s ties with the national agencies provided ILEC’s big projects 
(such as Lake Basin Management Initiative or LBMI, 2003-2005 - setting up a decentralized 
basin governance system with the Global Environmental Facility or GEF, the world largest 
independent funder of projects to improve the global environment) with access to national 
funds, but the ILEC was accordingly held to be accountable to the nationally defined criteria 
(Kotani 2006, pp. 34-35, H. Kotani, interview, 12 May 2010). 
 
Fund-raising was critically important not only for building Shiga’s coalition but also for 
maintaining its involvement in international environmental cooperation. The question of how 
to achieve sustainable ILEC financing remained unanswered. The ILEC was constantly faced 
with the limitations of ILEC capacity to gain access to adequate resources. While financial 
responsibility for the World Lake Conference (WLC) rested with the local hosts, primary 
ILEC income was derived from fund-raising on an individual project basis. Take, for 
example, the GEF-funded LBMI for which the ILEC was the executing agency. It was also 
co-financed by the Japanese national government (supplied from Japan Trust Funds at the 
World Bank). The IBMI was thusdependent on funding not only from international 
organizations but also heavily from the national government. The ILEC accordingly 
attempted to act as an independent provider of expertise on lake-basin management for 
successful implementation (ILEC 2007). In this sense, the sub-national level of participation 
involved some degree of mutual and reciprocal relationships with other spheres of authority if 
it was neither formally independent nor functionally interdependent on equal terms (S. 
Matsumoto, interview, 12 May 2010, T. Kagatsume, interview, 12 May 2010). 
 
Not surprisingly, another challenge the ILEC had to face was to avoid duplication and 
overlap of its programmes and resources (horizontal policy integration). One such potential 
was to monitor and provide early warning information on environmental threats. At the 
UNEP, the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS), which was inaugurated in 
1972 as a result of the UN Stockholm Conference on the Environment, was already running a 
global monitoring program. For the water quality of lakes and reservoirs, the GEMS Water 
Programme was dedicated to providing data in cooperation with the World Health 
Organization (WHO). To its surprise, the ILEC found that the programme database had 
comprised only 34 lakes/reservoirs around the world. In 1986 the ILEC began to collect 
environmental and socio-economic data of major lakes and reservoirs in cooperation with 
universities, research institutes, and government departments around the world, and provided 
world-wide users with “World Lakes Database.” Over time, however, the GEMS Water 
Programme also developed its own global database, GEMStat, that contained data for 425 
lake and reservoir stations. While each of these database projects sought to meet its own 
information needs, part of their requirements could overlap with each other. Information 
management thus required avoidance of duplication.  
 
Perhaps the most important initiative for integrating local action into international lake-
environmental governance (vertical policy integration) was the 2003 official launch of the 
World Lake Vision.
6
 The drafting of this vision was initiated in 2001 by the ILEC in 
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 The World Lake Vision resulted from a series of meetings and consultations with scientists, 
policy-makers and politicians from a number of drafts that had been produced between 2001 
and 2003 by a Drafting Committee. The need for the sustainable use of fresh water had been 
previously addressed at the international arena, such as those stated in the Dublin Principles, 
Chapter 18 of Agenda 21, and the World Water Vision. However, the unique properties of 
lakes had never been specifically addressed in these previous efforts. In 2003 the World Lake 
cooperation with the UNEP, in order to guide lake stakeholders in developing and 
implementing local lake visions and action plans. The World Lake Vision argued that local 
lake visions should be accountable not only for the local causes and effects of lake 
degradation, but also those that can be regional or international in nature, such as flood and 
drought due to the impacts of climate change (WLVC 2003, pp. 17-30). To this end, local 
lake visions, while their precise action would be determined by the local conditions, were 
encouraged to use existing international conventions and protocols (such as Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Convention to Combat Desertification, and others) to implement the principles of the World 
Lake Vision (WLVC 2003, p. 29). As stakeholders participated in the management cycle of 
developing, implementing and refining local lake visions, the World Lake Vision facilitated 
policy learning in which they looked beyond their national boundaries to study each other’s 
policy initiaitives and experiences. There was a potential for the development of common 
norms of expected lake management to facilitate the process of sub-national participation in 
providing the environmental public goods of world order.
7
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Vision was introduced at the 3
rd
 World Water Forum to draw the attention of citizens groups, 
lake managers, scientists, and policy-makers. 
7
 To integrate the World Lake Vision into a practical action program, in 2005 the World Lake 
Vision Action Project was adopted at the 4
th
 World Water Forum. In the following year, it 
called for action reports from around the world. The World Lake Vision Action Report 
Committee (WLVARC), comprising 30 lake management experts, continued to synthesize 
the lessons learned from the locally specific experiences into a comprehensive assessment of 
the application of the World Lake Vision principles and then facilitated further application of 
these principles to local lake visions around the world. See World Lake Vision Action Report 
Committee (WLVARC) (2007). 
Conclusion 
The emergence of the coalition formation between Shiga and the UNEP can be seen to stem 
from mutual dependence among the two parties in the sense that one party needs the 
assistance and cooperation of the other in order to achieve policy outcomes. Although not 
involved in material resource exchange on equal terms, the formation of the coalition can be 
conceived as horizontally ordered and bypassed the exclusive jurisdiction of the national 
government without, however, directly challenging the existing inter-governmental relations. 
Without sufficient institutional powers and legal competences, however, Shiga was 
eventually pressured to operate on behalf of the national government once trying to maintain 
the coalition. The vertically ordered, traditional state-centric framework crept into the 
maintenance of the coalition. The general account may not hold well for sub-national 
governments to participate in already existing transnational governance networks that offer 
resources for their effective engagement. This dimension is yet to be examined in other 
applicable cases. 
 
In this case study, the Shiga prefectural government recognized the institutional capacity 
limitations of the national government to facilitate policy learning beyond national borders 
and experienced the greater governance gap that the inability of the national bureaucracy 
created to sense the need for sub-national level of participation in international environmental 
governance. The prefectural government accordingly looked beyond its national border as a 
compensation mechanism. It called for help from the UNEP to see how its counterparts in 
other countries are coping with lake environmental management. In general, the institutional 
capacity limitations may be considered a precondition for subnational governments to 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
transnationally reach out for policy learning when they pursue their own agenda independent 
of national policy.   
 
The Japanese national government has neither directly regulated nor enabled sub-national 
level of participation in international environmental governance but a few front-runner sub-
national authorities are willing and capable of participating in it in the absence of national 
policy. Shiga was able to get involved only because the prefectural government successfully 
tapped on the legitimating power that derived from its constituencies and somehow found a 
way through non-institutionalized channels to move across the national boundary. A 
multiplication of channels for sub-national mobilization was very limited in Japan. In general 
terms, it is less likely that those channels will regularize the patterns of the participation of 
sub-national governments that are not operating on behalf of a national government at the 
international level. Institutionalized channels tap sub-national mobilization and policy 
involvement more successfully than non-instiuttionalized ones. As seen in this case study, 
once reached at the maintenance stage of the Shiga-UNEP cooperation, the prefectural 
government had immediately to deal with the gate-keeping capacity of the national 
government (retaining the national state power to control sub-national finance) for financing 
its projects. In the case of Japan, changes in the formal powers of sub-national authorities are 
likely to occur only within nationally-led enabling frameworks (channels of influence 
institutionalized by national policy). 
 
In advanced democracies, sub-national authorities represent their constituencies; therefore, 
sub-national activities need to be in the interest of the sub-national territories. By mobilizing 
transnationally, sub-national authorities might simply promote their narrowly defined sub-
national interests as if they were lobbying for just particular interests. In the case of Shiga, 
however, the prefectural government and its constituencies ended up sharing broad public 
interests in sub-national level of participation at the international level. The legitimacy of the 
sub-national participation initially derived from the community values reflected in citizens-
led issue framing. The experience of the international conference, which was then facilitated 
by electoral slack, raised public awareness and promoted the production and diffusion of 
information regarding the need for linking the framed sub-national issue to international 
environmental cooperation. This was instrumental in getting the establishment of the ILEC 
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